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COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW AND JOURNALISM

Jerome A. Barron*

I. WHEN THE SOURCE BECOMES THE STORY

May a source enforce a promise of confidentiality given it by a newspaper reporter? In 1991, the United States Supreme Court considered this
issue in the case of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.' Cohen was a First
Amendment version of man bites dog. The source and not the reporter sued
to protect reporter-source confidentiality. The defendant was not the state
but the press. For the American newspaper press, Cohen was a difficult
case. In the past, the press had contended that the First Amendment protected a reporter from being forced by the state, or anyone else, to divulge a
confidential source. In Cohen, however, the newspaper defendants were
reduced to arguing that, in essence, the First Amendment was two-faced.
The same First Amendment which protected reporters from being required
to divulge sources, permitted newspapers to breach the promises their reporters made to their sources. Here indeed was a reverse twist.
A chronicle of the Cohen case from the Minnesota state trial court to the
United States Supreme Court, this Article highlights some important features
of the relationship of the practice of journalism to First Amendment law.
First, there is a vital connection between the integrity of journalism and the
untrammeled flow of news. Second, there is a First Amendment dimension
not only in publishing newsworthy information, but sometimes in withholding it. Third, the First Amendment is not a guarantor or insurance policy for
the press, but instead is a guarantor for the information process. Finally,
even when a Supreme Court First Amendment decision does not protect the
press in the short term, the result may provide greater protection in the long
run.

* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, National Law Center, George Washington
University. The author would like to thank Mark A. Schaefer of the George Washington
University National Law Center Class of 1994 for his excellent research assistance. The
author also gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of C. Thomas Dienes and
Donald P. Gillmor, as well as the valuable bibliographic assistance of Paul Zarins of the
staff of the Jacob Bums Law Library at George Washington University.
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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A. How It Began
The fall of 1983 was the scene of an election campaign in Minnesota.
Wheelock Whitney was running as the Independent Republican (IR) candidate for governor.' Rudy Perpich and Marlene Johnson were running as
the Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) party candidates for governor and
lieutenant-governor respectively.3 Dan Cohen and Gary Flakne were active
in the struggle of the Independent Republicans for the governorship.4 The
public relations director of an advertising agency and a long time IR supporter, Dan Cohen was handling the advertising for the Independent Republicans.' Gary Flakne, a former IR legislator and county attorney, discovered
that Marlene Johnson had been arrested for unlawful assembly in 1969, and
in 1970 for petty theft.6 Flakne scheduled a meeting of IR supporters to
discuss what to do with his discovery.7 Dan Cohen attended the meeting.8
Cohen, it was agreed, would release this information to the media, but insist
on retaining his anonymity as far as the public release of the information
was concerned. 9
Dan Cohen contacted four joumalists-Lori Sturdevant of the Minneapolis Star Tribune (Star Tribune), Bill Salisbury of the St. Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch (Pioneer Press Dispatch), Gerry Nelson of the Associated
Press (AP), and David Nimmer of WCCO Television." Cohen told them
he had some information which might relate to the forthcoming election."
He said that he would make the information available to the journalists if
agreements could be reached on the basis under which the information
would be provided. 2
Later that day, Cohen met with Sturdevant and Salisbury and told them
that he would furnish them with documents concerning a candidate running
in the election if they each would give him a promise of confidentiality."
Cohen wanted to be treated as an anonymous source; he did not want his
2

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd

in part and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991),
aff'd on other grounds, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
3Id.
4 Id.

5Id.
6

Id.

7Id.
8

Id.

9 Id.
10 Id.
1 Id.
12 Id.
13

Id.
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name used. 4 He also wanted the reporters to agree not to ask him who was
his source. 5
From the outset, the responses of the media organizations to the information Cohen offered were the same. Sturdevant for the Star Tribune
"promptly and unequivocally agreed to Cohen's proposal." 6 Salisbury for
the PioneerPress Dispatch agreed immediately to Cohen's request for anonymity. 7 Gerry Nelson of the AP and David Nimmer of WCCO Television
also made promises of confidentiality to Cohen. Cohen then delivered the
documents to each reporter."
Once the documents had been delivered to their respective reporters, the
reaction of the media organizations to the information Cohen presented took
sharply divergent directions. Some of the organizations chose not to use the
information and some did. 9 At issue was the manner in which the story of
Marlene Johnson's past came to the attention of the Twin Cities media. Dan
Cohen, who was handling the advertising for the Independent Republican
gubernatorial candidate, was at the same time trying to undermine the reputation of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for lieutenant-governor.
Was the story the arrests in Marlene Johnson's past, or was the real story
the lengths to which one party would go to destroy an opponent's chances
an election? Some editors thought the latter was the bigger stoof winning
20
ry.
The Star Tribune responded quickly and assigned a reporter to find the
court records. 2' The reporter discovered that Gary Flakne, a Wheelock
Whitney supporter, had checked out the records the day before.22 Justice
Simonett for the Supreme Court of Minnesota described what happened
next: "[N]o one, before Flakne, had looked at the records for years. The
had checked out the records.
reporter called Flakne and asked why he
23
Flakne replied, 'I did it for Dan Cohen."'
The Star Tribune editor whose responsibility it was to decide whether to
run the story convened a "huddle" at 3:00 p.m. on the day Cohen had given
the documents to reporter Linda Sturdevant.24 The staff members who gathered in the "huddle" had to bear in mind a number of things. First, the Star
Tribune, like the PioneerPress Dispatch, had interviewed Marlene Johnson
14 Id.
15

Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.
18

Id.

19 Id. at 253.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1990).

20

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 253.
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on that day.25 Her reaction to, and explanation of, the arrests took some of
the sting out of Cohen's disclosures. Marlene Johnson had a good explanation for each arrest. Ultimately dismissed, the 1969 unlawful assembly arrest
was for protesting the city's failure to hire minority workers on construction
projects.26 The petty theft incident involved "leaving a store with $6 of
sewing materials at a time when Johnson was upset because of her father's
death."27
Another troubling matter was that the Star Tribune was a DFL paper.2"
If it did not print Cohen's disclosures about Johnson, they might be accused
of trying to protect the DFL. Never in its history had the Star Tribune failed
to honor a reporter-source agreement.29 Nonetheless, after considering ways
to indicate that the source came from the Whitney camp, the editor in
charge decided that it would be simply insufficient to describe the source as
a "Whitney supporter."3 There was no way to indicate that the source of
the story came from the Whitney camp without identifying Cohen as the
source.
Linda Sturdevant was not a member of the group which made the decision to name Cohen as the informant of the story about Johnson.3 She vigorously objected to breaching the agreement with Cohen and asked that her
name be removed from the story.32 Nevertheless, the Star Tribune asked
Sturdevant to call Cohen in an attempt to release the paper from its promise.33 Despite repeated pleas, Cohen refused.34 When it was clear that the
papers were going to publish the story anyway and name Cohen as its
source, Cohen issued a statement saying that the voters were entitled to the
information that he had made available.35 He said Perpich and Johnson
"were living a lie" each day that they failed to reveal the information about
Johnson to the voters.36
On October 28, 1982, the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch
went public with the story and named Dan Cohen as the source. The Star
Tribune disclosed Johnson's arrests as well as her explanation of the arrests.37 The article not only named Cohen as the source, but indicated he

Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201.

25
26

Id. at 201 n.2.

27

Id.

28

Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 253.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31 Id.
32 id.
33

Id.

34 Id.
35 Id.
36

37

Id.
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201-02.
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was employed by an agency doing advertising for the Whitney campaign.38
The story was almost complete, but did not mention that the Star Tribune
had breached its promise of anonymity to Cohen, nor did it mention that a
Star Tribune reporter felt that the breach was so shameful that she refused
to have her name on the story.3 9 Instead, the story, entitled "Marlene Johnson Arrests Disclosed by Whitney Ally," was attributed to "Staff Writer." °
The Star Tribune was willing to make Cohen look bad, but not itself. The
PioneerPress Dispatch, the other Twin Cities daily newspaper, reported that
Cohen was the source and indicated that Cohen had not wanted his name to
be used.4 As was the case with the Star Tribune, the Pioneer Press Dispatch did not say that Cohen had been promised anonymity. Unlike the Star
Tribune, however, the Pioneer Press Dispatch did not name Cohen's employer.42
The other media organizations to whom Cohen had made his information available responded in different ways. WCCO-TV kept its word and did
not identify Cohen as the source of the story, but also decided not to broadcast the story.43 The Associated Press reported Johnson's prior arrests without identifying Cohen as the source, but indicated that documents setting
forth the arrests and conviction had been passed on to their reporters."
The consequences to Cohen flowing from publication of the stories
came swiftly. His insistence on assurances that his name not be used turned
out to be justified. On the day of publication, Cohen was fired from his
job.45 To add insult to injury, he was portrayed as a duplicitous trickster by
the Star Tribune. Over the next two days, the Star Tribune published an
article and a cartoon criticizing Cohen's role in the Johnson story.' Judge
Short described the editorial and cartoon in his opinion for the Minnesota
Court of Appeals:
On October 29, the Tribune published a column criticizing Cohen for his self-righteousness and unfair campaign
tactics. On October 30, the Tribune ran an editorial cartoon
depicting a trick-or-treater outfitted as a garbage can knocking on the door of the DFL headquarters. The garbage can
was labeled "Last minute campaign smears," and governor

38

Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 253.

39

Id.

4 Id.
41 Id.
42

Id.

43 Id.

44 Id.
45 Id.

46Id. at

254.
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Rudy Perpich was opening the door, stating, "It's Dan Co'
hen."47
Sometime after October 31, Gary Flakne, the Independent Republican
attorney who had been Cohen's original informant, protested the two papers'
treatment of Cohen in a letter which he sent to the Pioneer Press Dispatch8 The letter criticized the breach of the agreement by the Twin Cities papers, and was published on the editorial page a few days after the
election.49 The Star Tribune ran an edited version of the letter and accompanied it with an article explaining why it had overridden the promise that
its reporter, Lori Sturdevant, had given to Cohen.5"
In December 1982, Dan Cohen brought suit against the corporations
which published the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch, charging

that the papers had breached their contracts and made fraudulent misrepresentations to him. 1 Pursuant to a jury verdict in Cohen's favor, the trial
court awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages.52 This victory was not the end of the matter; instead, it was just
the first legal skirmish in a long and fierce legal battle against the two dailies in the Twin Cities.
B. The Trial Court-Does a Reporter's Source Have Rights?

Media defense lawyer Richard Winfield has captured cogently the position of the newspapers in Cohen. The press "want it both ways: constitutional protection from having to reveal [sources]; constitutional protection from
having to pay damages if they do."53
The First Amendment had long been used as a shield by the press to
ward off censors, but whether it could also be used as a sword was uncertain. The two papers brought a pre-trial motion asking the trial court to rule
that the First Amendment immunized them from liability "for breach of an
otherwise valid contractual commitment to provide anonymity to its sources
in return for the provision of information."54 The Minnesota trial court reId.
Id.
49Id.
47
48

50Id.
51 Id.
2

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288 (Minn. Dist. Ct.

1988).

" Richard N. Winfield, Standing a Privilege On Its Head, COMM. LAW., Spring
1989, at 3.
14 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460,
1461 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. 1987). The trial judge denied the newspapers' motion for summary judgment, but
granted their motion to strike plaintiffs claim for damages as to the breach of contract
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jected this request,55 and observed that Minnesota's two largest newspapers
were not asking-as the press usually did-to shield the identity of its
sources.56 Rather, the press was asking to be held harmless from any adverse consequences that might flow from the decision of the two newspapers to* breach promises of confidentiality made by their reporters to a
source. 7 As Judge Knoll noted for the trial court, "[t]he newspapers seek
the right, not to shield, but to disclose, in the face of their prior agreement
not to disclose."58
C. The Minnesota Court of Appeals

Concluding that misrepresentation had not been proven, the intermediate
court of appeals in Minnesota trimmed Cohen's award by setting aside the
punitive damages. 59 The court of appeals, however, permitted the award of
$200,000 in compensatory damages based on the breach of contract
claim.'
The court of appeals did not believe that the First Amendment relieved
"the newspapers of the obligation they had to honor the terms of their contract with Cohen."'" Newspapers had "no special immunity from the application of general laws" such as the law of contract, and could not shield
themselves from liability for breach of contract "simply because the acts
giving rise to such liability were taken while in pursuit of newsworthy information."" The newspapers argued that their position was more than an attempt to use the First Amendment as a shield to ward off a contract claim
by one of the newspapers' sources.63 The case concerned the newsgathering
process itself.'
claim. Id.

51Id. at

1463-64.

Id. at 1461.
57 Id.
36

58 Id.
51 Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 262.
60

Id.

61

Id. at 256.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 257.

4 In 1972, Justice White declared, somewhat backhandedly, that newsgathering was
not without some First Amendment protection. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1972). Indeed, Justice White recognized that without some First Amendment protection
for newsgathering, "freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. In a later case the
Supreme Court declared that there was a presumption that criminal trials should be
open to the press and the public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
572-73 (1980). In addition, Chief Justice Burger observed for the Court:
Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by
word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through
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The newspaper defendants in Cohen invited the Minnesota Court of
Appeals to leave the problem of breach of the reporter-source confidentiality
agreement to ethics and not to the law.6" The court caustically rejected this
invitation. Allowing sources to recover damages, the court declared, was a
more effective incentive to honor such agreements than potential ethical
criticism of the offending newspaper by its peers in the press.66
If the contract between the source and the reporter was not enforceable
by the source-a reporter right of action was not considered-then, the
court suggested, the newsgathering process could be expected to dry up.67
The court of appeals refrained from saying that such a consequence gave a
First Amendment dimension to the source's lawsuit, perhaps because the
court felt boxed in by its position that the enforcement of reporter-source
contracts was simply a matter of contract law without First Amendment
significance.
The court took an oblique view of the notion that the editors were really
asserting a First Amendment right to publish. Concluding that the "newspapers effectively waived any First Amendment rights they may have had to

the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public. While media representatives enjoy the same
right of access as the public, they often are provided special seating and priority
of entry so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard.
Id.
Particularly relevant to the Cohen case, Burger's observations emphasize the role
that the media performs as surrogate for the public by acquiring information for the
public's benefit. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, rejected the newspapers'
claim that the journalist and not the source has the right to enforce a confidentiality
agreement. In defense of its conclusion, the court noted that not a single case had been
adduced which suggested that a source had no right to enforce a "confidentiality agreement." Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 257. On the contrary, there was, the court noted, a breach
of contract case which at least suggested that a source could bring an action "against a
publisher for breaching a promise of confidentiality." Id. (citing Huskey v. National
Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 n.15 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
Clearly, acquiring sources and protecting them so that sources will have the courage to talk to the press in the future is a vital part of the newsgathering process. It is in
this context that Chief Justice Burger's view of the press as a surrogate for the public
should be understood. From this media surrogate for the public perspective, it is argued
that it is not wise to permit a source to file suit against a news organization. A strong
case can be made that source-media disputes should be left to conscience rather than to
law to resolve. The motives of sources are too ambiguous, and the nature of the information they may offer too uncertain, to subject the media to possible manipulation. Yet
a right of action accorded to the source might engender just such manipulation. The
source may wish to protect his confidentiality for many reasons, some having a connection with the newsgathering process, and some not.
61 Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 257.
66

Id.

67

Id.
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publish Cohen's name as the source of the documents relating to Johnson,"6 the court of appeals assumed without discussion that the reporters
could waive the papers' rights. The newspapers tried to trump the obligation
to honor a confidentiality agreement with a source by emphasizing the
newsworthiness of Cohen's identity. The papers said that at the time the
reporters made the agreement, they did not realize that the information Cohen would give them "would ...make Cohen seem petty and unscrupulous
for having released it."69 Judge Short of the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
however, responded that the reporters' waivers were "not any less knowing
or voluntary merely because they did not know exactly what information
they would receive. "70
The claim for misrepresentation that Cohen won at the trial court was
set aside by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 7' The reporters did not misrepresent themselves when they promised Cohen confidentiality; they fully
intended to perform. 72 Cohen contended that misrepresentation was demonstrated because the reporters concealed "the fact that they had no authority
to bind the newspapers," 73 but there was no indication that the reporters
who promised confidentiality had "special access to the newspapers' written
policy [sic] regarding confidentiality. 74 On the contrary, the "evidence
showed that [the reporters] were unaware of [pre-existing written policies]. 75 Cohen also argued that the editors never intended to perform the
contracts,76 but the past practice of the newspapers had been to honor the
promises of confidentiality given by the reporters:
In fact, no witness could recall a prior instance when the
promise of a reporter was vetoed by an editor. Seasoned
reporters believed they had authority to bind the newspapers.
Based on past practice, we believe they did have such authority. Because it was the newspapers' practice to honor
their reporters' promise of confidentiality, the reporters did
not by omission misrepresent their authority.77
The court of appeals set aside the $500,000 punitive damages award

68

Id. at 258.

69 Id.
70 Id.
71

Id. at 260.
at 259-60.

72 Id.

" Id. at 260.
74 Id.

75 Id.
76
17

Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
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because it was based partially on the misrepresentation claim.78 The court,
however, ruled that contracts existed between Cohen and the newspapers,
and that the newspapers had breached those contracts.79 Accordingly, the
jury verdict of a damage award for $200,000 in compensatory damages for
breach of the contracts was recoverable. 0 The editors were aware, or
should have been aware, that loss of employment could occur "if the confidences [were] revealed."81
Judge Crippen of the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrote a separate
opinion in which he agreed in part and dissented in part from the majority
opinion.82 Judge Crippen believed that damages should not be awarded for
"publishing political material," because the imposition of damages infringed
on the First Amendment. 3 Cohen was asking the courts to "to enforce an
agreement not to publish-a pledge not to exercise press freedom."' The
trial court award based on contract constituted, in Judge Crippen's view, an
impermissible intrusion into the editorial process: "It is for editors, not the
courts, to decide when promises on content should be made and to decide
when publication is important."85 Deciding whether identification of a
source is necessary for an accurate report of a political matter is an editorial
function.86
Press discussion of the conduct of a political campaign lies at the very
center of that which the First Amendment should protect. Judge Crippen
conceded that the press publication claim does not always take primacy in
First Amendment law. For example, the law of libel weighs the right to
publish against the right to reputation and prefers one right over the other
depending on the status of the libeled plaintiff and the content of the alleged
defamation. Unlike a libel claim, however, the published information in
Cohen was true.88
There was a manipulative quality to Cohen's approach to the confidential nature of the reporter-source agreement. Cohen had engineered "a political scheme to broadcast a political attack but at the same time to evade
responsibility for the act."8 9 In Judge Crippen's view, Cohen's behavior
was deceptive: "To accomplish his ends [Cohen] chose not to approach the

78

Id.

79 Id. at

258-59.

80 Id. at 262.
81 Id. at 260.

Id. at 262 (Crippen, J., dissenting in
Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
84 Id. at 263 (Crippen, J., dissenting in
85 Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
16 Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
87 Id. at 265 (Crippen, J., dissenting in
88 Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
89 Id. at 266 (Crippen, J., dissenting in
82

part).

83

part).

part).
part).
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editors who would be expected to make publication decisions."90 Notwithstanding Judge Crippen's perceptions, Cohen did what most sources
do-they talk to the reporter on the beat, not the editor in the newsroom. Indeed, people in the position of political operatives like Cohen are more
likely to know the political reporters on a newspaper than the editors in the
newsroom.
Judge Crippen said the court of appeals did not need to decide whether
all reporter-source agreements were enforceable or unenforceable. 9' The
issue of whether some such promises would be enforceable in the future
could be deferred. 92 Here the First Amendment prevented the enforcement
of the contracts. 93 Some contracts are void because they are against public
policy. 94 The newspapers' contracts with Cohen, said Judge Crippen, were
void because the public policy they offended was that of the First Amendment. 95
Judge Crippen objected bitterly to the majority's view that the reporters
waived the First Amendment right of the newspapers by promising Cohen
confidentiality. First Amendment rights had not been clearly, compellingly,
and knowingly waived. 96 Cohen had not disclosed to the reporters that his
real goal was to accomplish "an editorial decision to repudiate the fundamental responsibility to fairly and truthfully inform the public on political
campaign conduct."97
There is a rebuttal to Crippen's analysis. Reporters use sources to provide information that might otherwise not see the light of day. They use
these sources even when the source's motives are ignoble, and even though
the source may not have not disclosed the whole story. If the state is trying
to find out the identity of the source from the reporter, the fact that the
source may have acted ignobly or not told all he knows will not prevent the
reporter from relying on either a First Amendment-based journalist's privilege or a state shield law. There does not seem to be any reason why turnabout is not fairplay, and why a source should not be able to insist on confidentiality in such circumstances.
D. The Reaction of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
Generally speaking, Cohen's case against the Twin Cities papers met

Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
92 Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
9'Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
" Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
96 Id. at 267 (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
9'Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
90
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with a sympathetic reception from the two Minnesota lower courts. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, rejected Cohen's claim that he
should be granted damages as a consequence of the betrayal of confidentiality promised him.98
The Supreme Court of Minnesota did not think Cohen had a contract
with the two Minnesota papers.99 The issue was not whether the papers had
acted honorably toward Cohen, but whether the promises the reporters had
given Cohen were contractually binding.' 0 In concluding that there was no
enforceable promise or contract, Justice Simonett for the Supreme Court of
Minnesota discussed the nature of the promise to protect a source: "[T]hese
promises are usually given clandestinely and orally, hence they are often
vague, subject to misunderstanding, and a fertile breeding ground for lawsuits." 0 '
The Supreme Court of Minnesota opinion in Cohen is primarily an essay
on Minnesota contract law. The theme of the court's discussion is that the
parties to the agreement to protect Cohen's anonymity did not intend a
contract. This notwithstanding, Justice Simonett suggested that a source
might have a claim in promissory estoppel: "We conclude the promise is not
enforceable, neither as01 2 a breach of contract claim, nor, in this case, under
promissory estoppel."'
Justice Simonett did not think that the reporter and the source were
really engaged in making a contract. Instead, Simonett viewed their agreement as "an 'I'll-scratch-your back-if-you'll scratch mine' accommodation. ' Contract law was ill suited to describe "the special ethical relationship" between the reporter and the source."° Further, contract law
would introduce an unwanted "legal rigidity" into that relationship.' 5
Finding that a promise of confidentiality made by the reporter to the
source was not a legally enforceable contract, Justice Simonett explored
whether the promise was legally enforceable on some other basis, specifically the law of promissory estoppel. "Impl[ying] a contract in law where
none exists in fact,"" 6 the law of promissory estoppel applies when a
promise was made to induce specific action on the part of the promisee, and
injustice can be avoided only be enforcing the promise. In such circumstances, the promisor is precluded, or "estopped," from denying his promise.
In deciding whether promissory estoppel should be applied to Cohen's
98

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990).

99 Id. at 203.
Id.

100

101 Id.

02 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
,03 Id. at 203.
104 Id.
105 Id.

106 Id.
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situation, Justice Simonett found the truly difficult question to be whether
injustice had in fact occurred. 7 Although Cohen lost his job as a result of
the publication of the stories by the Twin Cities papers, the facts of the case
were, as Justice Simonett noted tactfully, "fraught with moral ambigu08
ity.",
Cohen had tried to blacken Johnson's name. When the newspapers published the story, they condemned Cohen's tactics, but kept silent about their
own wrongdoing-the breach of their promises to keep Cohen's identity
secret. The question of whether injustice had occurred, said Justice
Simonett, required the court to undertake an examination of the same considerations that are weighed to determine "whether the First Amendment has
been violated."'0 9 Addressing whether Cohen's name was newsworthy and
essential to a balanced and fair account of Marlene Johnson's prior arrests,
Simonett asked whether it would have been enough just to say that the
source of the information concerning Johnson's past was someone close to
the Whitney campaign."0 Justice Simonett noted that the witnesses at trial
gave conflicting answers to these questions."'
It was also significant that the case involved a "political source ...

in a

political campaign," providing political information that was true."2 In
such circumstances, Justice Simonett declared, "enforcement of the promise
of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate
defendants' First Amendment rights."" 3 "There may be instances," Justice
Simonett observed, "where a confidential source would be entitled to a
remedy such as promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in enforcing
the promise to the source
outweighs First Amendment considerations, but
'" 4
case."
a
such
not
is
this
Certainly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision in Cohen was a
victory for the particular newspapers involved, but Justice Simonett's statement that a source might have a legal right in some future case made it a
less than total victory for the press. Counsel for the Cowles Media Compa-

ny, publisher of the Star Tribune, had argued that the relationship between
the reporter and the source, or the newspaper and the source, was a relationship which should not be actionable at law." 5 In their view, the function
of the First Amendment was to limit subjection of the press-source relation107

Id. at 204.

108

Id.

'0oId. at 205.
110Id.

111Id.
112 Id.

113 Id.
114 Id.

...Brief of Appellant Cowles Media Co. at 31, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457

N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (Nos. C8-88-2631, CO-88-2672).
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ship to legal enforcement." 6
The suggestion that the source might have a legal remedy in promissory
estoppel, was, at the time it was announced, the most explicit recognition in
American law that a source might be protected. Cohen itself, however, was
a poor vehicle for conferring legal rights on the reporter's source. Information about the prior arrest record of a candidate in an election is a matter of
great public interest. There is a strong First Amendment interest in seeing
that disclosure of that information is not hampered by the state's action. A
conclusion, therefore, that the First Amendment precluded recognizing a
promissory estoppel claim in these circumstances might have been expected,
but the mode of analysis used by the Supreme Court of Minnesota was
somewhat unusual. Describing the promissory estoppel issue as raising essentially the same questions presented by the First Amendment issue, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota stated:
Under a promissory estoppel analysis there can be no
neutrality towards the First Amendment. In deciding whether
it would be unjust not to enforce the promise, the court must
necessarily weigh the same considerations that are weighed
for whether the First Amendment has been violated. The
court must balance the constitutional rights of a free press
against the common law interest in protecting a promise of
anonymity." 7
A more conventional approach would have been to say that although Cohen
might have had a promissory estoppel claim, the state interest in redressing
such claims was subordinated to the First Amendment interest in providing
truthful information to the public about every aspect of a political campaign.
The practical upshot of the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision was
that a source makes his information available to the press on the strength of
a promise of confidentiality that the press can not be required to keep. A
source discloses information to the journalist at his peril. Arguably, the
supreme court did not go quite so far. It left the door slightly ajar, suggesting that a source might be able to secure legal redress on a promissory
estoppel theory in different circumstances.
What circumstances would these be? Could redress be forthcoming even
for the publication of truthful information? John Borger, a lawyer for the
Star Tribune in Cohen, suggested a situation where such redress might arguably be obtained." 8 Suppose a news organization was approached by a
..
6 Id. at 28 (citing Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 264 (Crippen, J., dissenting in part)).
"7
"'

Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
See Interview with John Borger, Esq., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 8, 1990) (notes

on file with author).
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source who offered to identify the local leader of the Mafia, but the source
said that it would do so only if the reporter promised to keep the identity of
the source confidential. Through some mistake the story naming the local
Mafia leader indicates the name of the source. The day after the story identifying the source appears, the source is murdered. The family of the source
might have an action against the newspaper on a promissory estoppel theory.' 9 In such extreme circumstances, one might conclude that the interests
at stake in protecting the anonymity of the source would subordinate free
press interests in publication of the source's identity.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota decision in favor of the newspapers in
Cohen fell just short of a total victory for the two defendant newspapers.
The bitter comments filed by the dissenting justices in Cohen indicated that
such victories run their own risks for the press. In an angry dissent, Justice
Yetka declared:
This decision sends out a clear message that if you are
wealthy and powerful enough, the law simply does not apply
to you; contract law, it now seems, applies only to millions
of ordinary people. It is unconscionable to allow the press,
on the one hand, to hide behind the shield of confidentiality
when it does not want to reveal the source of its information;
yet, on the other hand, to violate confidentiality agreements
with impunity when it decides that disclosing the source will
help make its story more sensational and profitable.'
Justice Yetka noted that the contest between the press and the individuals with whom it may quarrel is too unequal. 2 ' This feeling was not restricted to judges, as evidenced by the willingness of the Minnesota jury to
give Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages.
Justice Yetka's dissent also mentioned another point which he did not
develop. As a result of the Cohen decision, "potential news sources will ...
be reluctant to give information to reporters. '"122 Consequently, the public
could be denied information of far more significance about political candidates "than the rather trivial infractions disclosed here."'2 3 It is puzzling
that Justice Yetka did not approach this issue in First Amendment terms.
After all, in the famous Branzburg case, the United States Supreme Court
had been urged to protect the newsgathering process by recognizing a

119
21
121

Id.
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
Id. (Yetka, J., dissenting).

22
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reporter's or journalist's privilege.124 If the reporter could not have a privi-

lege to protect his source, the flow of news would dry up. Cohen raised a
related issue. If the source does not have a privilege to protect the promise
of confidentiality on the strength of which he gave new information, the
flow of news can also dry up. In short, the First Amendment interest in the
newsgathering process requires protection of the promise of confidentiality
whether asserted by the reporter or the source.
Justice Kelley also dissented from the supreme court's majority opin"' He associated himself with the analysis of Judge Short in the Minion. 25
nesota Court of Appeals and with the views expressed in Justice Yetka's
supreme court dissent. 26 Both Yetka and Kelley objected to the newspaper
defendants' cynical use of the First Amendment.127 Praising Justice
Yetka's dissent on this point, Justice Kelley excoriated the "perfidy of these
defendants," and accused them of seeking to escape liability "by trying to
crawl under the aegis of the First Amendment, which, in [his] opinion ha[d]
nothing to do with the case."' 28 Contradicting himself somewhat, Justice
Kelley then went on to note that the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision
refusing to enforce the promise made to Cohen inhibited, rather than promoted, First Amendment objectives since it would lead to the "'drying up'
[of] potential sources of information on public matters."' 29 Justice Kelley's
basic point, however, was that enforcement of the right to know and the
protection of confidential sources should be the responsibility of the legislature and the courts rather than "executives of the commercial media."' 30
II. THE COHEN CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT

American journalism was troubled when the Supreme Court of the United States decided to hear Cohen. The Washington Post published an editorial on the matter on December 11, 1990.'' Admirably, the editorial dis32
closed that the Post had a 26% share in the stock of the Star Tribune.
The Post's editorial illustrates the ambivalence of American journalism-its
desire to be on the side of the angels while at the same time in a crisis to
protect its interest.

124 Branzburg

v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972).
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 206 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 207 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 205 (Yetka, J., dissenting); id. at 207 (Kelley, J. dissenting).
121Id. at 207 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
29 Id. (Kelley, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 207 n.1 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
131When the Source Sues, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1990, at A22.
25
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In the real world of journalism, we know that far fewer
people would provide information to the press, and thus to
the public, without the anonymity that protects jobs, personal
relationships and reputations. We believe not only that reporters are morally bound to keep their word in such a case
but that the free exchange of information would suffer irreparably if, as a general rule, they did not. It is in journalists'
own interest not to undermine their reliability with sourc133
es.
The editorial suggested that the reporters breached their moral obligation
to protect the confidentiality of the sources who trusted them. In fact, the
reporters had remained consistently steadfast to their moral obligation. It
was the management of the papers who would not stand behind the promises of the reporters they employed. Lamenting that the case had arisen at all,
the editorial expressed concern that "understandings that [were] almost universally accepted about the responsibility of the press to its sources [would]
be altered.' 1 34 Did this mean that a decision in favor of the press would
frighten sources into believing that journalists cannot be trusted, or did it
mean that a decision against the press would encourage sources to believe
that if their promises were breached they could sue to enforce them?
The editorial praised the Supreme Court of Minnesota's conclusion that
the participants did not believe that they were entering into a binding contract in a commercial sense, and that the participants had entered instead
into a nonbinding ethical undertaking. 35 The implication was that the
breach of an ethical undertaking by newspaper management should not be
punished. The Post editorial concluded: "It is troubling that at least four
Supreme Court justices have voted to review this decision."'136 In the end,
a great newspaper suggested that a source who relied on the promise of the
press should have no recourse.
A. The Oral Argument
During oral argument, Elliot Rothenberg, Cohen's lawyer, noted that
Cohen implicated two First Amendment values. First, to assure the free flow
of information, the news media makes promises to sources. Second, to avoid
drying up the flow of information provided by those sources, the promises
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must be kept. 13' Rothenberg did not refer to what Justice Yetka called the
"perfidy" of the newspapers towards his client.
Much of the oral argument was devoted to the question of which side
had the stronger claim for invocation of First Amendment protection. Justice
O'Connor pushed Rothenberg on the strength of the First Amendment interest requiring enforcement of the promise not to disclose Cohen's identity. 3 1 She asked whether Cohen could get an injunction to prevent publication of his identity if such publication would be in violation of the promise
made to him. a9 Struggling with the question, Rothenberg responded: "That
presents the issue of prior restraint, Your Honor, and it would present a
different issue than damages."'4 ° Justice Scalia observed dryly that
Rothenberg seemed worried about the issue of prior restraint. 4 ' Presumably the implication was that if enjoining the publication of truthful information about the source of a story violated the First Amendment, so too does
awarding damages.
Justice Stevens asked a tough question. Suppose that one state enacted a
statute making promises not to reveal a source generally unenforceable, and
another state enacted a similar statute but with a preamble stating that such
contracts would violate the First Amendment-would both statutes "have the
same constitutional result?"'4 Rothenberg responded shrewdly that he assumed that "the newspapers themselves would not support [the former]
statute."' 43 By this, Rothenberg probably meant that although in Cohen the
newspapers were arguing that a promise of confidentiality by a reporter to a
source should not be honored, he doubted that they would support the position as a general proposition. In this, he was presumably right. If state law
does not enforce promises of confidentiality by a reporter to a source, it is
unlikely that a source, fearful of exposure, would trust a reporter to honor
such a confidence.
Justice Stevens observed that Cohen's position, as articulated by
Rothenberg, was that the First Amendment did not require the Supreme
Court of Minnesota to refuse to enforce the agreement between the reporters
the
and Cohen."' On the other hand, Stevens noted that one could reach
45
same result by saying that it was required by the First Amendment.

"' See 200

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES 638 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1991) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS].
138
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Rothenberg tried to use a waiver argument to dispose of the newspapers'
First Amendment justification for breaching the promise made to Cohen.
Once the promise of confidentiality is made, he contended, "the newspaper
has in effect waived the right to make any First Amendment claim of a right
to violate the promise."'46 Rothenberg continued:
You had a similar situation in the Snepp case [that] Justice
Scalia mentioned where a person promised not to publish
any information regarding his employment at the CIA without first getting the approval. He broke the promise. He
claimed a First Amendment right to do so. The court ruled
that he couldn't do it-in fact-establish a constructive trust
on all the profits from the publication in that case. 147
John French argued the case for the newspapers, noting two essential
facts. First, the published statements at issue were entirely true. 4 ' Second,
the statements involved matters of great public interest.'49 French contended that the newspapers had been exposed to the equivalent of prepublication
review:
These newspapers have had to live now for nine years with a
lawsuit which at the trial stage appeared to be going to cost
them $700 thousand in compensatory and punitive damages.
And of course, has over the course of nine years cost them
countless thousands in attorneys' fees. That kind of sanction
can be just as chilling on free speech as the sanction imposed by prepublication injunction. 5 °
When Chief Justice Rehnquist interjected that these were simply consequences that the press should weigh before breaching an agreement they
had made, French responded that the press should not have to weigh the
consequences. 5' Rehnquist had little patience for this argument. In his
view, special solicitude for the press in such circumstances was not warranted: "Mr. French, any number of large concerns which have the potential
for doing damage to people ... have to live with a certain threat of litigation. That's part of doing business in our economy, isn't it?"' Whether

141

141

Id. at 648.
Id. (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)).

148

Id. at 649.

149

Id.

S1oId.

151 Id.
152

Id.

at 651.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:2

fear of litigation may intimidate free expression responded directly to a
point Rothenberg had made at the beginning of his oral argument. When
ordinary people-people who are not journalists-breach promises they
the newshave made voluntarily, the law holds them accountable; therefore
1 53
papers "should be subject to the same law as everyone else.1
In addition to addressing the issue of whether the Minnesota law of
promissory estoppel should be treated in this context as a law of general
applicability, the Justices' questions during oral argument directly confronted the question of the newspaper defendants' integrity. In a rhetorical flourish, French observed that the First Amendment protects the "utterance of
honest, accurate speech,"' 54 quickly provoking the following colloquy:

QUESTION:
MR. FRENCH:
QUESTION:
MR. FRENCH:
QUESTION:
MR. FRENCH:
QUESTION:
MR. FRENCH:
QUESTION:
MR. FRENCH:

QUESTION:

Mr. French, on the word "honest," did
you publish that you promised not to
publish that?
The two reporters gave Mr. Cohen a
promise that they wouldn'tDid you publish that the deal was made
not to release it?
They did not, Your Honor.
Well, now you're talking about truth. You
didn't publish the truth.
The entire truth about everything did not
get published.
You did not publishBut what this Court has saidYou didn't publish all the truth.
That's absolutely right, Your Honor.
What the Court has said, however, on that
score is that is a subject to be left to
editorial judgment. This Court has said
that editorial judgment is a part of the
free press publication process that is entitled to constitutional protection.
So what you're asking us to vindicate is
publication of the truth as truth is determined by the editors.'55

The exchange illustrates that the indignation of the dissenting justices on
the Supreme Court of Minnesota at defendant newspapers' behavior in Co'3 Id. at 638.
'5
155

Id. at 653.
Id.
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hen had evoked some responsive chords among the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Indeed, later in French's oral argument, Justice
Scalia made reference to dissenting Justice Kelley's view that "the First
Amendment [was] being misused to avoid liability under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel."'' 6
B. Justice White's Opinion in Cohen
Nearly twenty years had passed since a case directly involving the
journalist's privilege had come to the United States Supreme Court, and
once again Justice Byron White was assigned the role of writing the opinion
for the Court.' As in Branzburg, Justice White decided against the
press.5' In the years since Branzburg, Justice White's view that the First
Amendment did not give absolute protection to the press had intensified
rather than diminished.
Rothenberg, in his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, presented the issue as a "question of whether the First Amendment
empowers newspapers to inflict injuries with impunity by deliberately breaking promises of confidentiality given for the purpose of obtaining desired
information."' s This characterization of the issue made it clear that whether the press should keep its promises to sources was not an abstract issue.
Injury was inflicted-because of the press's failure to keep its promises,
Dan Cohen had lost his job.
Rothenberg noted that the Supreme Court of Minnesota had relied on
the United States Supreme Court decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo 6° which struck down a Florida statute giving political candidates a right of reply to newspaper charges. 6' The Supreme Court of Minnesota believed that Miami Herald had given great protection to editorial
autonomy.'62 Rothenberg, however, pointed out that the Supreme Court
later stated clearly that the Miami Herald case "[n]either expressly or impliedly suggest[ed] that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry
whatsoever."'63 Rothenberg's approach to Miami Herald was particularly
156 Id.

at 660.

...Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), was the first Supreme Court
case directly involving the journalist's privilege since Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665

(1972).

158Cohen,

501 U.S. at 670.

's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991) (No. 90-634), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 364.
1- 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
161 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Cohen (No. 90-634), reprinted
in LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 371.
162 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 371.
163 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 371 (quoting Herbert v.
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well advised as far as Justice White was concerned. Having concurred in
Miami Herald, Justice White nonetheless had complained about the imbalance in the communications process between the individual and the
press.1" Furthermore, in Herbert v. Lando,6 ' Justice White wrote the
opinion for the majority in which the Court declined to construe the First
Amendment to create a new evidentiary privilege against disclosure of the
editorial process."'
Justice White was less tormented by the issues raised in Cohen than was
the press, but there remained an undercurrent of annoyance in his opinion.
In his view, the First Amendment was being manipulated in an impermissible manner. Counsel for the newspapers had contended that the Supreme
Court of Minnesota's decision rested exclusively on state law, and that the
Supreme Court should dismiss the case because it presented no federal law
issue.'67 Justice White dismissed these contentions as hardly requiring discussion."' The Supreme Court of Minnesota had specifically concluded in
its opinion that enforcing the promise of confidentiality under a theory of
promissory estoppel would violate the newspapers' First Amendment
rights.'69 Indeed, Justice White complained, the newspapers had contended
all along that the First Amendment prevented the enforcement of the promises made by the reporters to Cohen. 7 Even if the newspapers now
wished to argue that the case presented no First Amendment issue, it was
very clear to Justice White that one existed.
The argument that the First Amendment prevented a recovery by Cohen
against the two Twin Cities newspapers who had breached their promise to
him was quickly rejected. In his characteristically plain and direct manner,
Justice White set forth what he saw as the issue in Cohen: "The question
before us is whether the First Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach
of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information. We hold that it does not."''

Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 (1979)).
64 Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 259-63 (White, J., concurring).
165441

66
167

U.S. 153 (1979).
Id. at 175.
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667. Cowles Media stated in its brief that Cohen's legal theo-

ry had an "audacious scope." His breach of contract claim "left no room for consideration of free press interests or of the public's interest in obtaining full and accurate
information about an upcoming election." Brief of Respondent Cowles Media Company
in Opposition to Petition at 12, Cohen (No. 90-634), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 137, at 397.
168
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For Justice White, the critical point was that which had been critical in
Branzburg twenty years before. General legal obligations apply to the press
no less than they apply to others."' The First Amendment provides no refuge to the press from generally applicable laws.' Appropriately, Justice
White, in an effort to document this point, started with the Branzburg case.
Justice White recalled that in Branzburg he had spoken similarly of the duty
of the press to conform to generally applicable law.'74 It was the
journalist's duty to respond to the obligation "shared by all citizens," a
grand jury subpoena served pursuant to a criminal investigation.'75
The interest of the press in publication of truthful information did not
exempt them from the copyright laws, the labor laws, the minimum wage
laws, or the antitrust laws.'76 In prior cases, the press had sought exemptions from these laws, but the Court had held that there was no warrant in
the First Amendment for an exemption from generally applicable laws."'
It was very clear, Justice White declared, that the Minnesota doctrine of
promissory estoppel was also a law of general applicability.' The First
Amendment did not protect the press against a law which did not target or
single out the press.'79 The Minnesota law applied to promises upon which
people rely, and was "generally
applicable to the daily transactions of all the
180
citizens of Minnesota."'
John French, in his argument for the newspapers, contended that the
First Amendment protected the publication of truthful information.' Did
application of the Minnesota promissory estoppel law to the newspapers in
Cohen constitute a punishment of the press for publishing truthful information? Justice White observed that the newspapers had in fact published the
information. 82 Thus, having to pay damages as a consequence of
breaching a promise not to publish the information should not be viewed as
punishment, but instead as "a cost of acquiring newsworthy material to be
published at a profit.' ' 83 Certainly that is how the situation would be analyzed if the reporter and the source had signed an agreement with a liquidated damages provision in the event of breach.8 4 Paying damages in these

"I Id. at 670.
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circumstances, said Justice White, was no different from "a generous bonus
paid to a confidential news source." ' 5
Simply put, Justice White believed that the newspapers made a deal. To
get certain information, the newspapers agreed to keep other information
confidential, but then published what they had promised to keep confidential. The state did not require the press to make the original promise or to
publish. In such circumstances, if a newspaper broke its promise, it should
pay damages.
It would be hard to understate Justice White's lack of sympathy for the
newspapers' contention that the press was being punished for the truthful
publication of lawfully acquired information. Justice White was not sure that
the acquisition of the information was in fact lawful."8 6 He did not consider information to be lawful that was acquired only by making promises
which were then not honored.' 87
Justice White made another point in Cohen which should be emphasized. Dan Cohen was not seeking damages for matters which touch on free
expression. He was not suing for damages because he was savagely parodied, or because his reputation was destroyed.'88 He was seeking damages
because of the consequences of the breach of the promise made to him-he
was fired from his job and his earning capacity was diminished. 9
One should not conclude from the foregoing, however, that the Court
was rooting either for Dan Cohen or for enforcement of reporter-source
agreements. Indeed, towards the end of his opinion, Justice White appeared
to go to great lengths to advise the Supreme Court of Minnesota about the
non-First Amendment grounds available to it on remand which would allow
it to reach the same result it had reached earlier.90 He suggested these
non-First Amendment grounds for a decision in support of the newspapers
and against Cohen in an effort to respond to a comment in Justice Souter's
dissent. ''
Justice Souter reasoned that if, the First Amendment notwithstanding, a
source can sue a newspaper for disclosing his identity, newspapers will be
given a legal incentive to decline to identify a confidential source even
when that source's identity is highly newsworthy.'92 White responded by
pointing out that although Cohen had asked the Supreme Court to reinstate
the $200,000 jury verdict in compensatory damages, the Court rejected that

15' Id.
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request.'93 Justice White further indicated that it was not clear whether the
Minnesota law of promissory estoppel would in fact result in a recovery for
Cohen.194
In summary, if one reads Justice White's opinion in Cohen closely, it
appears that he is not saying that Cohen should recover and that the press
should lose. Rather, the subtext of the opinion appears to be that the
newspapers should not win the case on a First Amendment basis. The
American press, on the whole, had long insisted, as their position in
Branzburg demonstrated, that the First Amendment protected the confidentiality of the reporter-source agreement. Perhaps Justice White thought it was
impermissible hypocrisy for the press now to urge that the First Amendment
allowed them to publish what they had so long insisted the First Amendment authorized them to withhold-the identity of their confidential sources.
Perhaps Justice White did not believe that the First Amendment should be
used to achieve a result which would compromise the integrity of journalism
in the future.
C. The Dissents
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, stated that
enforcement of Minnesota promissory estoppel law in these circumstances
would violate the First Amendment and constitute an impermissible penalization of the publication of truthful information concerning a political campaign.'95 Blackmun did not view the Supreme Court of Minnesota as having created any exemption from generally applicable law for the newspapers
of the Twin Cities. 96 For him, it was not the identity of the speaker, i.e.,
the press, that was important, but the character of the speech.'97 The
speech involved public debate arising in the course of a political campaign.
There could not be, under a regime ordered by the First Amendment, any
state restriction of political speech. 9
Once again the ambiguous status of a First Amendment basis for the
journalist's privilege raised a problem. The First Amendment-based
journalist's privilege existed in the living law of the lower courts, whatever
its status in the Supreme Court. Justice Blackmun's position, therefore, is
somewhat troubling. On the one hand, the First Amendment confers a privilege to withhold information provided by confidential sources. On the other
hand, the state may not consistent with the First Amendment restrict the

9 Id. at 672.

Id.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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truthful publication of political information, except in the most exigent circumstances.' 99 Which is more important-the long-term societal interest in
the acquisition of information for the press, or the giving effect to the shortterm editorial judgement that something is so newsworthy that it merits
immediate publication, despite the promise of confidentiality by which it
was acquired?
For Justice Blackmun, the newspapers' ability to publish truthful political information was important for preservation of the First Amendment. 00
It is not clear, however, that he weighed this interest against the societal
interest in the long-term preservation of the acquisition of information by
the press, nor is it clear that he understood that protecting publication of the
source's identity in this context might jeopardize the competing press and
societal interest in the acquisition of information. In this respect, Cohen
represents one of the agonies of contemporary American journalism, because
it shows the press pitted against itself. Regardless of who wins in Cohen, a
press interest suffers.
Justice Blackmun, however, did not see Cohen as presenting competing
First Amendment interests, nor, indeed, did he see it as a press case at all.
Instead, the case involved whether the First Amendment should protect the
publication of political speech against state restriction. Justice Blackmun
would protect political speech against such restriction whether the defendant
seeking to publish was a media defendant or non-media defendant.20 '
Blackmun did not acknowledge a press, a societal, or a First Amendment
interest in the acquisition of information. He did not see the dilemmas
Cohen's suit presented for freedom of the press. This is vividly illustrated in
the end of Blackmun's opinion, where he noted that truthful speech can
never be proscribed by the state unless some compelling state interest of the
highest order will be served thereby.0 2 The opinion of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, he continued, made clear that enforcing its law of promissory
estoppel in these circumstances did not meet this exacting standard.0 Justice Blackmun, however, neither articulated nor even recognized the First
Amendment interest in the untrammeled flow of news, i.e., the vitality of
the connection between the publication of truthful information and the acquisition of information. For example, Justice Blackmun wrote that
Branzburg did not involve the imposition of liability because of the content
of what was published.0 4 He failed to recognize, however, that five Justices in Branzburg were willing to give some First Amendment protection to
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authorize the withholding of certain information on the basis of content,
namely the identity of sources.0 5
Citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,°6 Justice Blackmun argued
that the law may not "punish the expression of truthful information or opinion."2 7 Justice White distinguished the Hustler case because he thought it
was not a case in which the plaintiff was trying to use a novel legal theory
in order to impose liability on a newspaper defendant for the publication of
truthful information.20 In Hustler, refuge was sought in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to avoid the law of libel.20 9
Blackmun said Hustler was precisely on point because the law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress was no less a law of general applicability
than the law of promissory estoppel.21 The burden on publication of
speech wrought by Cohen, in Blackmun's view, was not an incidental burden on speech, but a burden on "the publication of important political
speech." ''
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor,
wrote a separate dissent. 2 Souter said that it was not "talismanic" that the
law of promissory estoppel was a law of general applicability; it could still
"restrict First Amendment rights just as effectively as those [laws] directed
specifically at speech itself."2 3 Justice White's view was that because the
burden on publication of truthful information was self-imposed by the newspapers, one could dispense with consideration of constitutional interests that
might support publication.2"4 Justice Souter did not agree; waiver by the
newspapers of their interest in the publication of truthful information by
agreeing not to publish in the first place did not exhaust the First Amendment interest involved.2"'
The public has a First Amendment interest in the publication of truthful
information. Information that a Republican activist was the source behind an
effort to discredit a Democratic-Farmer Labor candidate for state-wide office
in Minnesota could be the kind of factor on which an election might turn.
Justice Souter insisted that the speaker's First Amendment rights were not
the sole concern; the citizenry also has a First Amendment interest in the

205
206
207

See infra note 246.

485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Id. at 671.
Id.
210 Id. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)).
214 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 677-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208

209
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publication of the information.116
As Justice Souter observed, the "universe of information relevant to the
choice faced by Minnesota voters" would clearly be expanded by knowing
Dan Cohen's identity.217 In such circumstances, the interest in "unfettered
publication" outweighs the promise of confidentiality.' Justice Souter's
dissent rightly eschews an absolutist approach. There were circumstances, he
conceded, when a breach of confidentiality by a newspaper might result in
liability, but not in this case.2"9 In this instance, the First Amendment interest presented was based entirely upon publication. The question of whether there was a First Amendment interest in protecting confidentiality was not
considered-but it should have been.
D. Back to the Supreme Court of Minnesota
Although Justice White reversed the Supreme Court of Minnesota, he
refused to reinstate the $200,000 in compensatory damages that Cohen had
been awarded.2 The Supreme Court of the United States decided only
that the First Amendment did not authorize the press to "disregard promises
that would otherwise be enforced under state law." ' The Minnesota
courts could decide that a case in promissory estoppel had not been made
under Minnesota law, or, alternatively, they could decide that the Minnesota
constitution could be interpreted "to shield the press from a promissory
estoppel cause of action such as this one. 222 In short, Justice White suggested two bases for a decision in the Supreme Court of Minnesota-reliance on the state law of promissory estoppel, or on the state constitution.
Realistically, the very mention of these possibilities suggested that Cohen had won only a pyrrhic victory, and that the Supreme Court of the
United States was signalling to the Minnesota courts that there were other
ways to preclude Cohen from obtaining any recourse for the breach of the
promise made to him. This, however, was not the way the Supreme Court of
Minnesota interpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision.
If the Supreme Court of Minnesota had still been inclined to favor the
newspapers and deny or delay a recovery by Cohen, grounds were certainly
available for it to have done so, but having given the press the benefit of the
doubt the first time around, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was not in-

26
2'
118
219
220
221
222

Id. at 678 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 679 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 678 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
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clined to do so again. It was rather clear that the Supreme Court of Minnesota was tired of the players in Cohen. In a short opinion, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota quickly reinstated the $200,000 verdict in favor of Dan
Cohen.223
When the Supreme Court of Minnesota had previously considered the
case, it had held that the $200,000 award that Dan Cohen had won in the
lower court could not be sustained on a theory of breach of contract.224 On
remand, however, the court concluded not only that the verdict could be
reinstated on a theory of promissory estoppel, but that it did not need to be
sent back to the trial court on the issue of promissory estoppel.225 Based
on the unique circumstances of the case, it would be unfair not to let Cohen
be decided on a promissory estoppel basis. The issue had been the same
' The
throughout--"the legal enforceability of a promise of anonymity."226
court observed that "promissory estoppel is essentially a variation of contract theory. ' '227 The evidence produced at trial was as germane to a theory
of promissory estoppel as it was to contract. There was simply no need for a
new trial. The case could be decided now in favor of Cohen on a theory of
promissory estoppel.
There was yet another option open to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
It could have interpreted its state constitution to afford the newspapers
broader protection than that afforded by the First Amendment. Justice
White, it will be recalled, had mentioned this alternative. 22' The Supreme
Court of Minnesota made it clear that it did not wish to take this course.
The issue presented-whether promises of confidentiality given by journalists to a news source were legally enforceable-was a novel one. The First
Amendment dimensions of this issue were as yet unclear. Until the impact
on freedom of expression caused by allowing sources to sue newspapers
was significantly clearer, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was not inclined
229
to exercise the state constitutional law option.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also considered the newspapers' argument that awarding damages for the publication of Cohen's identity would
23 °
limit the public's interest in "the free flow of important information.
The court was not sure that the newsworthiness of Cohen's identity was so

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 1992).
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990).
225 Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 388. For a discussion of this case from the point of view
223

224

of the law of contracts, see Gregory F. Monday, Cohen v. Cowles Media Is Not a
PromisingDecision, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1243.
226 Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 390.
227

Id.

228

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).

229
230

Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391.
Id.
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important that it justified invalidation of the promise of anonymity.", The
complaint of the newspapers was that they should not be punished for wanting to acquaint the electorate of Minnesota with the "whole truth" about a
political story. 23 1 The court responded that the needs of the electorate
would have been satisfied by including in the story that3 the source was
23
someone close to the DFL candidate's political opponent.
Denying Dan Cohen any relief at all would work an injustice.3 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota summarized the newspapers' journalistic practice of honoring promises made to sources: "The Pioneer Press Dispatch
editor stated nothing like this had happened in her 27 years in journalism.
The Star Tribune's editor testified that protection of sources was 'extremely
important.."' 23 1 Yet neither newspaper wished to destroy the political career
of an opposing candidate without having the source's partisan political purpose attributed to him. In short, newspapers wanted to be freed from their
reporters' promises because the big story was not the peccadillos of a political candidate. The big story was the identity of the candidate's accuser.
Neither party was on high moral ground. Each party said that the behavior of the other was unethical.236 Justice Simonett observed that on the
basis of the evidence at trial, the case could be well characterized as a case
of the "pot calling the kettle black. 2 37 Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota was in no mood to see the litigation continue.
Cohen had won at last! And not just a moral victory-he had won
$200,000.
III. DRAWING SOME CONCLUSIONS AND NOTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
COHEN

In his brief before the Supreme Court, Elliot Rothenberg said the central
question presented to the Court was whether "the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution grant[ed] newspapers immunity from liability for damages
caused by dishonoring promises of confidentiality given in exchange for
' Although the Supreme Court did
information on a political candidate."238
not answer this question in quite the all-encompassing way in which it was
posed, it came close. The Supreme Court held that, in circumstances such as
those found in Cohen, the First Amendment did not provide newspapers any
231

Id.

232

Id.

233

Id.
Id.
Id. at 392.

234
235

236

Id. at 389.

237

Id.

238 Petition

for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663

(1991) (No. 90-634), reprintedin LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 355.
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refuge or escape from the law of promissory estoppel.23 9 For American
journalism, the message of Cohen was clear. To the same extent as other
citizens of the state, the press would be responsible for the promises they
breached, upon which others had relied to their detriment.24° The First
Amendment provided no escape.
Two general conclusions can be made about Cohen. First, Cohen held
that the First Amendment did not preclude a suit for breach of a reportersource confidentiality agreement under state law. Second, Cohen did not
hold that the First Amendment required the allowance of such a suit. In
short, Justice White did not regard Cohen as a great First Amendment case.

If one compares Justice White's opinion in Cohen with his opinion in
Branzburg, it is clear that Justice White regarded Branzburg as presenting a
major First Amendment issue.24 Justice White held in Branzburg that a
reporter had no First Amendment privilege to decline to give evidence to a
grand jury in a criminal matter,242 but he explained in detail that both law
and policy argued against creating a First Amendment-based journalist's
privilege.243 In Cohen, on other hand, he appeared to take the position that
the case simply presented no First Amendment dimension. Of course, the
First Amendment significance of the case can be explained otherwise. For
example, one commentator analyzing Cohen stated that the Court "upheld a
waiver of First Amendment rights." 2 " Indeed, this commentator noted that
"[t]he Court in Cohen, in fact, explicitly sanctioned the waiver of First
Amendment rights in order to enforce an agreement of confidentiality be'
tween two private parties." 245

After Cohen, it is still disturbingly unclear whether the United States
Supreme Court recognizes a qualified First Amendment-based journalist's
privilege.246 Certainly, there is no indication from Justice White's opinion
239

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).

240

Id.

...Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
242 Justice White, writing for the Court, specifically refused to create a First
Amendment-based privilege for journalists:
Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted
in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. We are asked to create another by interpreting the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not
enjoy. This we decline to do.

Id. at 689.
243 Id. at 693-708.
4 G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2455 (1992).
245

Id.

246 Although

there was a majority for the judgment in Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665

(1972), there was no one opinion which commanded the support of a majority of the
Justices. The plurality opinion for the Court was written by Justice White, and joined by
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Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id. Justice Powell wrote a
concurring opinion. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). These opinions produced the
much publicized holding that there was no general First Amendment journalist's privilege. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, recognized a qualified First Amendment-based privilege. Id. at 725 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion purported to recognize an
absolute journalist's privilege. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In the long run, Justice Stewart's opinion, although a dissent, may have had more
impact than any other opinion in Branzburg. Rare is the situation when a dissent is
more influential than the opinion for the Court. Justice Stewart set forth a framework
for the judicial recognition of a qualified First Amendment-based privilege. Id. at 743
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In the years following Branzburg, Stewart's analysis met with
considerable acceptance in the lower courts, particularly in civil cases involving a
journalist's privilege. See infra note 247.
Justice Stewart said he would require the government to show three things before a
journalist could be required to testify before a grand jury. First, the government would
have to show that there is probable cause to believe that a journalist has "information
that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, the government would have to show that the information sought could not be obtained by other means less destructive of First Amendment rights. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, the government would have to show a
compelling and overriding interest in the information sought. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart carefully characterized Justice White's plurality opinion for the
Court as holding "that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect his sources
when called before a grand jury." Id. at 725. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Note that Justice
Stewart did not describe the holding as constituting a complete rejection of a First
Amendment basis for a journalist's privilege. Thus described, Justice White's opinion in
Branzburg did not govern the whole field of civil litigation.
Justice Stewart was aware that his position might have more support than appeared
at first blush. He was also aware that the battle for a qualified First Amendment-based
privilege for journalists was not over. Justice Stewart observed that Powell's "enigmatic
concurring opinion" gave hope "of a more flexible view in the future." Id. at 725
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell had indicated that in other situations the First
Amendment might provide more protection to journalists than was warranted in
Branzburg. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J. concurring). Moreover, Justice Douglas's separate
dissent contended that the First Amendment conferred an absolute privilege on journalists seeking protection from having to divulge their sources to grand juries. Id. at 71213 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Powell concurrence and Douglas and Stewart dissents in Branzburg indicate
that five Justices on the Court might have supported the First Amendment claims of
journalists to protect sources in a non-grand jury context. As noted, the theory of the
Stewart dissent has had a successful run in the lower courts. See infra note 247.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to reconsider its rejection of a
First Amendment-based journalist's privilege. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182 (1990), a Title VII case before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court did not accept the contention that, in the interest of academic freedom, confidential peer review information acquired in a tenure review case should be
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in Cohen that he thought that there was such a privilege. Yet it is clear that
the lower federal courts have recognized a qualified First Amendment-based
journalist's privilege.247 If there is such a privilege, then it becomes very
important to establish its scope. Is it a privilege which only the reporter may
raise, or may it be invoked by either the reporter or the source?
If there is no First Amendment-based journalist's privilege, then the
press's position that it may decline to honor a reporter-source agreement is
less self-serving. In this view, an editorial judgment that existing
newsworthiness should trump a future and speculative need for sources
becomes a more defensible position.
Insofar as Justice White acknowledged any of the foregoing matters, it
was in connection with his rebuttal to the view espoused by Justice
Blackmun that the First Amendment protected the press against any law
which limited its right to publish truthful information. In reality, said Justice
White, this amounted to a view that the press should be exempt from generally applicable law.2 48 "The First Amendment," 249
declared Justice White,
"does not grant the press such limitless protection.
The question of whether the First Amendment precluded Cohen's suit
against the PioneerPress Dispatch and the Star Tribune deceptively masks
the complexities involved. First Amendment jurisprudence often disguises
the conflicts and the antagonisms that lie behind the word "press" and the
phrase "freedom of the press." There are three fundamental issues of law
and journalism raised by Cohen. First, what is the press? Second, what will
be the long term effect on journalism of enforcing reporter-source agreements? Third, what First Amendment values are served by non-disclosure?

protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 201. The Court remarked: "We were unwilling [in Branzburg], as we are today, 'to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult
journey to... an uncertain destination."' Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.

665, 703 (1972)).
247 Many cases in the federal circuit courts have recognized a qualified First
Amendment-based journalist's privilege. See Clybum v. New World Communications,
Inc., 903 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Zerrilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); see

also United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126, on remand, 511 F. Supp. 375 (D. N.J.), rev'd, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
Not all the circuits have been so accommodating. The Sixth Circuit, for example,
has rejected a qualified First Amendment-based journalist's privilege. See Storer
Communications, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.

1987).
248

249

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
Id. at 671.
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A. What Is the Press?-Reporters?Editors? Owners?
Reporters promised Dan Cohen that if he would be their source, they
would protect his anonymity. The reporters' editors, however, decided that
the news value of Cohen's identity was more important than the promises
the reporters had made to him.25° The newspapers in Cohen contended that
the journalist's privilege belongs to the media and not the source, and that
the decision to honor the privilege belongs to the editor and not to the reporter."' What is the media? Is it the reporter or the editor? Or is it the
ownership of a particular news organization?
Typically, the reporter will want to adhere to the confidentiality agreement made with the source in order to protect the integrity of the
newsgathering process. To protect the process, the source should have the
right to enforce a reporter-source agreement. If the reporter's news organization breaches the promise the reporter has made to the source, the
reporter's relationship with that source clearly is compromised for the future
in a matter vital to the newsgathering process. Absent the promise of confidentiality, some information simply is going to be unavailable. Cohen represents a conflict between the desire of the editors to publish and the desire of
the reporters to protect confidentiality. The reporters' concern is with the
newsgathering process; the editors' concern is with newsworthiness.
The Star Tribune's lawyer, John Borger, believes that from a reporter's
perspective, giving legal rights to the source empowers the reporter.252 A
reporter's promise under such circumstances means something; it has a
sanction behind it. Borger thinks editors see these issues from a public inter-

Some prestigious voices in American journalism were deeply disturbed that editors would overrule the promises of anonymity and confidentiality made by their reporters to a source. In an editorial, Editor & Publisher declined to support the action of
the editors in Cohen:
We believe that an editor who feels a reporter has not been justified in promising anonymity has an obligation both to the reporter and the news source to
work out some compromise with both. Leaving a reporter out on a limb after such
a promise has been reversed doesn't do the reputation of the reporter or the newspaper any good.
Confidentiality, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 6, 1988, at 6.
25 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co, 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In
answering the question-what is the media?-in the context of the journalist's privilege,
Justice White's statement of the claim for privilege in Branzburg merits reflection: "We
note first that the privilege claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).
252 See Interview with John Borger, Esq., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 8, 1990) (notes
on file with author).
250
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est perspective.253 The editor uses judgment and discretion to determine
when a promise to a source should be kept and when it should not. 54
Clearly, a decision to enforce a reporter-source agreement affects the
editorial process because it diminishes the editors' authority while increasing
the reporters' authority; reporters are given the apparent power to make
promises to sources with respect to confidentiality. Enforcement of reportersource agreements subordinates newsworthiness and the right to publish to
confidentiality and the integrity of the newsgathering process. Yet historically, the right to publish has long been held to have greater First Amendment
status than the right to gather information.255
The reporters for the two dailies in the Twin Cities did not intend to
betray Dan Cohen.256 They gave him a pledge of confidentiality as a condition of receiving the information about Marlene Johnson's criminal record
with the intention of keeping that pledge. For at least one of the reporters,
Star Tribune reporter Lori Sturdevant, Cohen's trust was essential because
he might be a continuing and valuable source. Indeed, when Cohen gave her
the documents, Sturdevant said, "This is the sort of thing that I'd like to
'
have you bring by again if you ever have anything like it."257
At issue was whether Cohen's motives justified the editors' decision to
overrule their reporters.258 John Borger argued in his brief to the Supreme
Court of Minnesota that the real interest which Cohen wanted the courts to
protect was "not the sanctity of any contract, but his interest in protecting
his reputation. '259 Cohen, however, would not have succeeded in a libel
suit because the facts the papers printed about Cohen were true.26 Even

assuming Borger's contentions were true, they were not relevant to the issue
of whether Cohen's agreement with the reporters should be enforced. The
editors decided that the fact Cohen made the information available was more
newsworthy than the information Cohen had provided. The relevant issue is
not whether Cohen would have won if he had brought a libel suit, but
whether newsworthiness should trump a confidentiality agreement made by
a reporter to a source. Editors have to be careful in answering whether
newsworthiness is always the transcendent value. Publish and be damned is
always a tempting response, but in his brief for Cohen in the Supreme Court
Id.
Id.
255 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 606, 684-85 (1971).
256 Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 259.
253
254

Id. at 252.
For a powerful and well documented argument that the source's motives should
matter, see Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential
Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 714-16 (1991).
259 Brief of Appellant Cowles Media Company at 43, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (Nos. C8-88-2631, CO-88-2672).
260 Id. at 11.
257

258

454

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:2

of Minnesota, Rothenberg made the telling point that "[t]he identity of virtually every confidential whistleblower is newsworthy."26 '
The press is not a monolith and is no less perplexed than the judiciary,
the legislature, and the public by what should be disclosed and what should
not. Journalism educator Ted Glasser saw Cohen not so much as a trial
between the plaintiff and the defendant as a trial between reporters and
editors. 262 Glasser challenged the positions that the newspapers' counsel
took in Cohen, disputing their contention that a reporter did not have the authority to promise sources to keep their identities confidential. "What in the
world," he asked, "is a professional journalist if not somebody who can go
out and represent the newsroom?" '63
Cohen held that the First Amendment did not preclude a source from
suing the newspapers. If, however, the reporters in Cohen had sued their
editors for breach of a contract that they believed to be in force between
them and their editors, the reporters would contend that their understanding
was that if they promised a source confidentiality, it was because their editors had impliedly promised the reporters that they would honor that promise. If the reporter then sued the editor for breach of this implied understanding, would the First Amendment interest lie in enforcing the reporter's
promise? The editor would argue that allowing such a suit would interfere
with editorial autonomy, but it is debatable whether this is more important
than allowing a reporter to insist on the integrity of her promises.
At the center of Cohen is the troubling question of what is meant by the
term "press." Rarely has a Supreme Court case underscored the import of
that question to the same degree as Cohen. Was the press in Cohen the
reporters who wished to honor the promise they had made to Dan Cohen, or
was it the editors who did not wish to do so? Professor Ed Baker, a First
Amendment scholar, has noted a distinction between press personnel and
press owners, and has observed that their interests may sometimes be in
conflict. "Protection of press personnel may best promote diversity and be
most central to the press's obviously vital fourth-estate role--checking
abuse by government .... Protecting these press personnel from censorship
by owners when their stories and exposes are contrary to the owners' perceived interest could promote fourth-estate values. 264 Professor Baker discusses the problem of owners versus journalists. In Cohen, the clash was
between reporters and editors, all of whom are journalists.
The novelty of Cohen is underscored by an example Professor Baker
provides, in which he cites the reporter's privilege of confidential sources as

26

Brief of Respondent Dan Cohen at 33, Cohen (Nos. C8-88-2631, CO-88-2672).
Eleanor Randolph, Editors, Reporters at Odds Over Confidential Sources,

262 See

WASH. POST, June 13, 1988, at A4.
263 Id.
264 C.EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 254 (1989).
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an instance in which owners' interests and reporters' interests are the
same. 265 As we have seen, Cohen introduced the interests of editors into
the equation as well. Of course, in Cohen, the owners obviously supported
the editors because the owners financed the lawsuit defending their editors'
positions.
The brief for the Pioneer Press Dispatch did not mention the internal
conflict between reporters and editors. Instead, counsel for the paper contended that the newspapers' decision to publish Cohen's identity despite
their promise to the contrary was "entirely consistent with ethical standards. 2 66 They argued that "an absolutist view ignores the danger that
confidential sources may seek to manipulate2 67the press and mislead the public by cloaking their identity in anonymity.

Justice White did not respond to arguments based on the character flaws
of either the source or the newspaper personnel in Cohen. The damages that
a newspaper might pay for breaching a promise to keep material confidential
were the sanction the law imposed. 268 The law did not prevent the material
from being published. In fact, the newspaper got everything it wanted. It got
both the confidential information and the opportunity to break the confidence and expose the source if the newspaper thought such exposure was
newsworthy. Damages for breach were simply a cost of doing
sufficiently
269
business.
What is the best way to handle reporter-media management conflicts
arising from breach of the reporter's promise to the source by the reporter's
media superiors? One approach would be to weigh the injury to
newsgathering against the strength of the newsworthiness of the identity of
the source. The trouble, however, with such a fact specific approach is that
it eats away at the integrity of journalism. Certainly, as far as sources are
concerned, the integrity of the reporter-source confidential relationship
would be totally lost. Presumably an editor, or some other third party, would
judge ex postfacto whether an agreement would be honored.
The difficulty of the problems presented by Cohen demonstrates how
unhelpful it is for newspapers to insist that "only the journalist and not the
source, has a right to enforce a confidentiality agreement. '27" When counsel for newspapers make such arguments, as they did in Cohen, it is the
views of media management and not the views of the reporter that are being
represented. The courts, of course, must resolve these conflicts. A simple
265 Id. at

255.
Brief of Respondent Northwest Publications, Inc. at 37, Cohen v. Cowles Media,
501 U.S. 663 (1991) (No. 90-634), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at
560.
6

267 Id. at 38, reprintedin LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 561.
268 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
269

Id.

270 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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solution that would support the information flow and benefit the integrity of
journalism would be to allow only the reporter or the source to enforce or
breach the agreement.
B. Cohen and Its Impact on Journalism
What are the consequences of the Cohen case for journalism? One happy result is that sources will no longer need to fear being forthcoming with
reporters. It was a proud claim of the Star Tribune in Cohen that it had
never before breached the confidence of a source. That tradition, despite the
Star Tribune's lapse in the case of Dan Cohen, can be expected to continue.
On the downside, a potential but nervous source may approach a reporter in
the future with a contract and demand the reporter's signature. If the problem in Cohen was, as the Supreme Court of Minnesota said, that the parties
did not really intend a contract, then one remedy is for the source and the
reporter to make a contract with the approval of the newspaper. Furthermore, the contract may set forth a sum for damages in the event that the
newspaper breaches the promise.
Another reaction that may be expected to flow from Cohen is the use of
guidelines by newspapers. Guidelines can furnish a missing governance to
the area of reporter-source agreements. On August 11, 1988, the Star Tribune published a message to its readers, signed by Executive Editor Joel
Kramer."' With considerable understatement, the Star Tribune opined that
recent flaps over reporter-source agreements had "created confusion among
reporters, editors and the community over how" such agreements would be
handled in the future.272 As a consequence, the paper said it was now publishing a set of written guidelines to "replace the mostly unwritten guidelines and standards" on which it had relied in the past.273
The Star Tribune made three observations in its summary of the
guidelines. First, frequent reliance on anonymous sources "increases the risk
'
of inaLcurate or unfair journalism."274
Second, quotes and anonymous
statements should be used only where both a "reporter and editor are satisfied that [the paper is] meeting [its] standards for accuracy and fair' Lest it be thought, however, that this statement placed editors and
ness."275
reporters on the same plane of equality, the Guidelines also admonish reporters: "If practical, consult with an editor before making any promises to
sources. If in doubt about the propriety of making a promise, always con-

27.Joel

Kramer, To Our Readers: Guidelines on Anonymous Sources, MINNEAPOLIS

STAR TRIB., Aug. 11, 1988, at IA.
272
273

274
275

Id.
Id.

Id. at 16A.
Id.
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suit."276
The Guidelines' third observation was a model of ambiguity. Published
after the Cohen controversy, it fell short of providing either sources, reporters, or the community with absolute certainty as to what the Star Tribune's
policy would be if a situation like the Cohen case should arise again: "We
will avoid making promises of confidentiality to sources that are not in the
newspaper's or the readers' best interest, but we will honor the promises we
'
make except in the most extraordinary circumstances."277
It is debatable whether the Guidelines, if they had been in effect prior to
the Cohen case, would have required the Star Tribune reporter to obtain an
editor's consent before promising Cohen confidentiality. The Guidelines
waffle on this question, and discuss "satisfying" both editors and reporters at
one point and "consulting" with editors at another point.278
Many newspapers have unwritten policies requiring prior approval of
editors before confidentiality is promised to sources, perhaps because written
'
Written documents can be obpolicies are "eminently discoverable."279
tained by opposing counsel in pre-trial discovery if a dispute with a source
heats up to a lawsuit.28 Furthermore, such written statements can be damaging. If the paper's standards are absolutely precise and a reporter or an
editor violated them, the paper is going to be in a worse position than if its
guidelines were unwritten or non-existent.
Another alternative is for a newspaper to have general guidelines, but
not make them too specific. This may explain why the Guidelines equivocate on the critical issue of whether the Star Tribune promises to honor
agreements with sources in the future. Reporters dispute that there was an
unwritten policy, pre-dating Cohen, which required the approval of an editor
before a reporter was authorized to promise a source confidentiality.281
Star Tribune reporters were dismayed when their editors published Cohen's
refused to have her name
name-so dismayed that reporter Lori Sturdevant
282
on the story disclosing Cohen's identity.
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Guidelines On Anonymous Sources and Confidentiality, MINNEAPOLIS STAR

TRIB.,
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Kramer, supra note 271, at IA.
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Winfield, supra note 53, at 4.
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See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)

(noting that "evidence showed that [the reporters] were unaware of [pre-existing written
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If the Star Tribune always had a policy of prior approval, why was
reporter Lori Sturdevant so angry when the paper published Cohen's name?
After all, she had not obtained prior approval. Sturdevant should have expected to be countermanded if she had disobeyed existing policy. It seems
clear that reporters were angry because they did not believe any approval by
editors was necessary to promise confidentiality to a source in the context of
Cohen.
In light of the foregoing, it seems likely that when a source gives information at his peril, risking his job, for example, Cohen may make resorting
to written agreements between reporter and sources more common than they
have been in the past. Several months before the decision of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in Cohen, a federal district court in Minnesota decided a
similar case, Ruzicka v. The Conde Nast Publications Inc.2"3 The court in

283

733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 939 F.2d

578 (8th Cir. 1991).
In Ruzicka, Jill Ruzicka was interviewed by Claudia Dreifus of Glamour magazine
for an article about sexual abuse of patients by therapists. Id. at 1290-91. Ruzicka had
brought a malpractice suit against a psychiatrist for improper sexual conduct during
therapy sessions, and she consented to be interviewed only on the condition that she
would neither be identified nor identifiable. Id. at 1291.
Having just started a new job, Ruzicka was anxious that her new colleagues not be
able to identify her from the article. Id. Other than specifying one particular matter,
Ruzicka did not indicate what kind of information would threaten her anonymity. Id. at
1291-92. The one matter specified was a detailed account of Ruzicka's own personal
experience of sexual abuse at the hands of her therapist. Id. at 1292.
When Claudia Dreifus went back to write the article, she decided she would like to
use Ruzicka's experience as one of two case histories. Id. She asked Ruzicka for permission to use her name. Id. Jill Ruzicka turned down Dreifus's request and reminded
her that they had agreed that Ruzicka should neither be identified nor identifiable from
the story. Id. After editing and a second draft, Glamour published a story by Dreifus in
its September 1988 issue. Id. Dreifus gave Jill Ruzicka the pseudonym "Jill Lundquist."
Lundquist is described as someone who went to law school after a malpractice suit was
settled, who served on a state task force while a practicing lawyer in Minneapolis, and
who had worked to criminalize sexual activity between therapist and patient. Id. Jill
Ruzicka had served on the Minnesota Task Force on Sexual Exploitation by Counselors
and Therapists. Id.
Ruzicka sued Conde Nast Publications, publishers of Glamour, on a number of
theories, including breach of contract. Id. Several questions intrigued the federal court.
By entering into the agreement with Ruzicka, had Glamour, through its writer, Dreifus,
waived its First Amendment rights? Even if Glamour had not waived its First Amendment rights, how should the competing interests presented be balanced in light of the
First Amendment?
Dreifus kept her promise not to identify Ruzicka. The article did not mention Jill
Ruzicka by name. This notwithstanding, had Dreifus broken her promise that Ruzicka
would not be identifiable? Judge MacLaughlin, the federal judge in Ruzicka, thought the
terms of the waiver in Cohen were clear, but he thought things were much less clear in
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Ruzicka concluded that if an agreement between a reporter and a source
specifies that the source should not be made identifiable, the agreement
must clearly indicate what type of information would make the source identifiable. 4 The reporter must pledge not to publish that specific information; otherwise, the agreement is too imprecise to warrant enforcement.
Accordingly, insistence on this kind of specificity calls for a written agreement.
In Ruzicka, the federal district court suggested that some agreements
may have sufficient specificity to permit enforcement by the source." Yet
resort to written agreements is hardly a panacea. After all, a written agreement is the adversary of the spontaneity, informality, and trust that gives life
to reporter-source agreements in the first place.
In summary, the impact of Cohen on journalistic practice with respect to
reporter-source agreements is likely to be threefold. First, the confidential
relationship between reporters and sources can be expected to continue.
Second, while the relationship continues, it is now more fragile than before.

Ruzicka's case. Id. at 1298. A reporter cannot know what information in a story will
blow a source's "cover." See id. In Ruzicka's case, she had only referred to one specific matter that might indicate who she was and asked the author not to refer to it. The
agreement not to make Ruzicka identifiable was held to be too vague to amount to a
waiver of the magazine's First Amendment rights. Id. at 1298. Contract actions, no less
than defamation actions, the court feared, might have a "chilling effect" on editorial
decision-making. Id. at 1300. This was particularly true of vague and indefinite oral
agreements to protect a source. "[A]t a minimum the Constitution requires plaintiffs in
contract actions to enforce a reporter-source agreement to prove specific, unambiguous
terms and to provide clear and convincing proof that the agreement was breached." Id.
On appeal in Ruzicka, the Eighth Circuit held that, although Minnesota law precluded a claim for breach of contract, a remand was warranted in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Cohen; promissory estoppel could be a viable theory of recovery.
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). On remand,
Judge MacLaughlin granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Ruzicka v.
Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F. Supp, 303 (D. Minn. 1992). The plaintiff had
failed to show a clear and definite promise sufficient to support recovery on a theory of
promissory estoppel. Id. at 312. On review, however, the Eighth Circuit noted that a
reporter-source agreement had been enforced on a promissory estoppel theory by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Cohen. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 999
F.2d 1319, 1320 (8th Cir. 1993). Concluding that summary judgment should not have
been granted, the Eighth Circuit remanded the matter to the district court once
again-this time for trial. Id.
In summary, looking at Ruzicka retroactively through the lens of Cohen, what conclusions can be made about the impact of Cohen on the future? Clearly, as far as promissory estoppel claims by sources are concerned, the ultimate result in Ruzicka illustrates that Cohen has provided and will continue to provide new legal protection for
sources.
28 Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1298.
285 id.
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As a result, newspapers can now be expected to use guidelines to govern
more closely their reporters and the promises they make to their sources.
Third, in cases involving particularly sensitive information, it may be more
common for nervous sources to demand that newspapers or reporters enter
into written contracts not to disclose their identities.
C. The First Amendment Interest in the Enforcement of Reporter-Source
Agreements
The defendant newspapers argued throughout the Cohen litigation that
the press had a First Amendment right to publish truthful information that
had been lawfully acquired.286 Consistent with this position, counsel for
the Pioneer Press Dispatch asserted that sometimes it was in the public
interest for reporters to break promises to sources.287 Counsel gave some
examples in which that had been done. For example, during the Iran-Contra
hearings, Colonel Oliver North accused Congress of leaking classified intelligence information about the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. At that point
Newsweek magazine revealed that "details of the interception" which Newsweek had published in a cover story had been leaked by "none other than
'
North himself."288
Counsel for Pioneer Press Dispatch cited another publicized example of
breach of a reporter source agreement, which involved Democratic presidential aspirant Jesse Jackson. A Washington Post reporter had interviewed
Jackson for a story on the condition that Jackson not be identified.289 Despite the promise of confidentiality, the reporter wrote that "[i]n private
conversations with reporters, Jackson had referred to Jews as 'Hymie' and
to New York as 'Hymietown."' 29 The reporter defended the breaking of
his promise to Jackson on the ground that Jackson's denigration or stereotyping of a group within the electorate should be "brought to the public's
attention" because Jackson was running for President of the United
States.29'

Clearly, newsworthy information can flow from breaching reportersource agreements as well as from enforcing them. Nevertheless, with comSee, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
287Brief of Respondent Northwest Publications, Inc. at 39, Cohen v. Cowles Media
286

Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (No. 90-634), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note

137, at 562.
288 Id., reprintedin LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 562 (quoting Two Leaks,
But by Whom, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 16).
289 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 562.
290 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 562 (quoting H. EUGENE

GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 126-27 (2d ed. 1987)).
291 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 562 (quoting GOODWIN,

supra note 290, at 126-27).
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mendable candor, counsel for the Pioneer PressDispatch acknowledged that
damage to the information flow could flow from breaking promises to
sources. "[J]oumalists have a critical interest in the continued availability of
confidential sources, which could be jeopardized if promises routinely are
broken and prospective sources come to doubt the integrity and good faith
of the press." '92
The media position on the First Amendment significance of refusing to
honor the promise of the reporters to Cohen was explained in an amicus
brief filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of many major media organizations and companies. The brief asserted that there was no First Amendment
interest in enforcement of the promises, and vigorously rejected the argument that enforcement was necessary to prevent "sources from drying
up. 2 93 The brief went on to rely on a federal district court case which
observed that confidential sources would continue to have an interest in
making their information public, despite the fact that they would have no
remedy if a promise of confidentiality was in fact breached.2 94
For historians of American press law, a fascinating irony was that nearly
twenty years earlier, Professor Alexander Bickel had filed an amicus brief
for the New York Times and other media organizations taking exactly the
opposite position from that espoused by the New York Times and its allied
amici in Cohen. The 1971 amicus brief contended that enforcement of reporter-source agreements was essential; otherwise news sources would dry
up.295 Professor Bickel took particular aim at the contention that sources
would still undertake to give confidential sources information to reporters
even if First Amendment protection were not given to such undertakings.2 96 Conceding that it was true that those who wished to propagandize
through the public would continue to use the media even if journalists were
forced to disclose their identity, Professor Bickel noted that this did not
mean that the untrammeled flow of news would continue.297 "The public's
right to know is not satisfied by news media which act as conveyor belts for
handouts and releases, and as stationary eye-witnesses. It is satisfied only if
reporters can undertake independent, objective investigations."2' 98
The media amicus brief in Cohen contended that it was "not the prov292
293

Id. at 41, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 564.
Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. at 22, Cohen (No. 90-634),

reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 622.
294 Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 137, at 622 (citing Ruzicka v.
Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991)).
295 Brief of Amici Curiae New York Times Co. at 7, United States v. Caldwell, 408
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ince of the courts to 'improve' the relationship between sources and reporters, any more than it [was] the province of the courts to 'improve' editorial
judgments." '99 This argument appears to leave the reporter and the source
to work out their relationships without resort to law. Again, Professor Bickel
memorably anticipated and responded to this argument in his 1971 amicus
brief: "The First Amendment standard of protection which these cases call
for and for which we contend turns, not on the whim of a given news
source, but on the integrity of the confidential relationship maintained by
reporters with all manner of news sources.
In 1971, Professor Bickel linked journalistic integrity to First Amendment protection.3 °' The implications of this connection are fundamental to
an understanding of that which was at stake in Cohen. Granting constitutional permission to newspapers to breach promises to their sources would place
an impermissible burden on the information flow. In sum, First Amendment
values were served, rather than denied, by enforcing the reporters' promises
to Cohen for two reasons-protection of the flow of information and protection of the integrity of journalism.
IV. CONCLUSION
The press is not protected as an institution for its own sake, but for the
sake of society. "[F]reedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value
of enhancing such discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and
thus more prudently self-governed."3 2 The public interest in information
relevant to the citizenry's choices as voters is not limited to a short-term
need for information about a particular story, even though the story itself
may be eminently newsworthy. There is also a long-term public interest in
securing access to such information for the future.
It is one thing to say that the First Amendment does not exempt the
press from honoring promises to sources. It is a different, more important
point to appreciate that there is a First Amendment interest in enforcing the
promises that reporters make to sources, even if it is the source who insists
on honoring the promise. There was a First Amendment interest in enforcing
the agreement that Cohen, the source, had with the reporters for the Star
Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch.
Neither Justice Blackmun nor Justice Souter, the dissenters in Cohen,
recognized that protection of the information flow is itself a First Amend-
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ment interest. Yet acquisition of information is critically bound up with the
capacity of the press to continue to be able to publish truthful information
about the political process. Justice White saw Cohen as a case which presented no First Amendment issue at all. Justices Souter and Blackmun saw
Cohen as a case where First Amendment rights were totally with the newspapers. In fact, Cohen was a press case where First Amendment rights were
in conflict. An acknowledgement by the Supreme Court of the multifaceted
nature of the First Amendment issue in Cohen would have been valuable.
Recognition that enforcement of reporter-source agreements has First
Amendment significance would have highlighted that which First Amendment jurisprudence had previously ignored. There are First Amendment
interests in protecting both confidentiality and publication. Cohen represents
a collision between these two First Amendment interests. In the event of
such collisions, the courts have the difficult task of weighing, in the light of
the unique circumstances of each case, the strength of the First Amendment
interest in the truthful publication against the First Amendment interest in
the integrity of reporter-source agreements. Unhappily, there is a common
thread in the three opinions in Cohen. None of the opinions acknowledged
that the First Amendment interest in securing an unclogged information flow
may be hampered by refusing to enforce promises to sources to keep their
identities confidential.
What does this say for the future of Supreme Court recognition of a
qualified First Amendment-based journalist's privilege? Once again the Supreme Court has declined to declare directly that there is a First Amendment
basis for the establishment of a journalist's privilege. Silence on this point
in Cohen may mean that the Court views the interest in protecting sources
as negligible or unproven. From this, one might draw the larger conclusion
that the Supreme Court is still unwilling, as it has been in the past, to grant
the relationship between reporters and their sources a First Amendment
dimension.
From the perspective of advocates of a First Amendment-based
journalist's privilege, there is an alternate and more satisfactory analysis.
Perhaps, Cohen was simply an occasion in which there was no need for the
Supreme Court to pass on whether First Amendment status should be accorded to the journalist's privilege. For those interested in protecting sources
in the hope of acquiring information vital to society, this is certainly the
acceptable construction.
In his brief for Dan Cohen in the Supreme Court, Elliot Rothenberg
referred to the media's dependence upon confidential sources for news:
In order to preserve the free flow of information, Minnesota and many other states have adopted shield laws to
protect journalists from compelled exposure of confidential
sources. Conferring upon newspapers a constitutional right to
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unilaterally violate promises of confidentiality would discourage potential sources and deny the public access to important
information.3 °3
Aside from the practical dependence of the media on sources for news,
no fewer than three First Amendment-related arguments support the general
contention that protecting the confidentiality of sources is a precondition for
much of the important news disseminated by the media. First, the public
interest in the acquisition of information by the press for the benefit of
society justifies recognition of a First Amendment basis for respecting the
confidentiality of reporter-source agreements. Second, in the lower courts a
First Amendment-based journalist's privilege conferring a large measure of
protection on reporter-source agreements has already been recognized. 0"
Third, this judicial recognition was prompted by the fact that four dissenting
justices and one concurring justice in the Branzburg decision indicated their
willingness to protect reporter-source agreements from forced disclosure in
the name of the First Amendment." 5
There is a continuing interest in making and honoring promises not to
disclose sources not only for journalism, but for the First Amendment as
well. Leaving sources without a remedy can limit severely the willingness of
sources to enter into agreements with reporters to provide information on a
confidential basis.
Whether reporter-source agreements should or should not be enforced
cannot be based on the facts of a particular situation. This is true whether
the situation involves sources as famous as Oliver North and Jesse Jackson
or as obscure as Dan Cohen. The overall question is larger than whether
sources can or should be able to require reporters to honor the basis on
which information is given to them. The larger issue is society's estimate of
the integrity of journalism.
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,3°6 a libel case, the Supreme

Court confronted the issue of how much latitude the First Amendment accorded journalists in dealing with quotations."' The Court gave journalists
some latitude, but denied them First Amendment carte blanche to deal with
quotations as they chose.30 ' Justice Kennedy gave two instructive reasons
for declining to leave the treatment of quotations entirely to the discretion of
journalists. The values served by the First Amendment would be jeopardized
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by such a doctrine. Those who are newsworthy in our society should not
fear and distrust journalists."'
In Masson, the Court saw the connection between serving First
Amendment values and the preservation of public confidence in the press. If
newsworthy people felt that they could not trust journalists to fairly attribute
to them what they had said, their availability to journalists might quickly
diminish or even vanish. Such a consequence would benefit neither the
public figures, the journalists, nor the free flow of information which the
First Amendment should assure."' In Cohen, the Court was less sensitive
to the intimate connection between First Amendment values and the integrity of reporter-sources agreements. Nonetheless, the result in Cohen, like the
result in Masson, upheld the integrity of journalism because it honored the
expectations of those with whom journalists deal.
Why is it that neither of the Twin City newspapers disclosed to their
readers that they had breached their promise to Cohen when they published
Cohen's identity? Perhaps the newspapers realized that their influence in the
world is limited by the extent to which they can be trusted. If the press
forfeits that trust, then the rationale for a free press also crumbles. In short,
what is involved in Cohen is more than assuring the free flow of information. It is the integrity of journalism.

0 Justice Kennedy made the following observation in this regard in Masson:
Not only public figures but the press doubtless would suffer under such a

rule. Newsworthy figures might become more wary of journalists, knowing that
any comment could be transmuted and attributed to the subject, so long as some
bounds of rational interpretation were not exceeded. We would ill serve ,the values
of the First Amendment if we were to grant near absolute, constitutional protec-

tion for such a practice.
Id.
at 520.
310 Id.

